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Abstract
This paper describes early retirement option programs in collective
agreements in Sweden during the 1990s. We highlight the di⁄erences be-
tween actual pension bene￿ts and those stipulated in the standard agree-
ments. We ￿nd that the individuals frequently face far better options
than those given by standard agreements. The mix and the timing of
pensions is usually done in a non-trivial way. Thus, if we just relied on
the standard agreement text, one important implication of these ￿ndings
is that the e⁄ects of economic incentives on retirement very well might be
over-estimated.
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11 Introduction
In the empirical retirement literature, there exists a wide variety of models trying
to explain the retirement behavior. Regardless of which model is in use, infor-
mation on economic incentives is required. The basic element is the stream of
future pension bene￿ts, from which the relevant economic measures are usually
derived. This stream is derived from the pension plans faced by the individual
and is generally a function of the earnings history, retirement age, and individual
characteristics. However, as there generally exists several parallel pension plans,
for which the individual is eligible, it is not uncommon that the individual can
choose among a large set of various combinations of the pension bene￿ts. That
is, the individual can combine the pension bene￿ts from di⁄erent sources more
or less freely. In Sweden, practically everyone is eligible for the national old age
pension and the occupational pension systems. For example, in some cases it
may be optimal to claim pension bene￿ts solely from the occupational pension
system systems until normal retirement age and then start claiming bene￿ts
from the national old age pension system as well. Such mixtures of pension
bene￿ts should be included in the stream of bene￿ts. Analysts commonly use
simplifying assumptions to restrict the number of available alternatives for the
individual. For example, the individuals are assumed to claim bene￿ts from all
available sources from day 1 of retirement.
Further, and perhaps more important, it is quite common that ￿rms and
other types of employers o⁄er older employees generous pension plans (so called
"golden handshakes") in order to reduce the number of employees and/or re-
structure the ￿rm. There may be strong incentives for ￿rms to "buy out" the
older employees as these are associated with high pension premiums rates. In
fact, as we will see below, individuals seem to receive occupational pension bene-
￿ts that are far above the bene￿ts stipulated in the collective agreements. Hence,
in order to estimate a model where such economic incentives are included, the
analyst needs information about the options available to the individual.
In this paper, we describe peoples￿actual pensions by looking at register
micro-data and compare this to prevailing rules. One ￿nding is that among
early retired with occupational pension agreements a substantial fraction had
replacement ratios far above the levels stipulated in the standard agreements.
The standard rules in the occupational pension agreement were hence set aside.
Further we show that many individuals who exit early ￿rst make use of
their occupational pension until the age of 65, without making any national old
2age pension withdrawal. At their 65th birthday they reduce the occupational
pension and start the (normal) withdrawal of national old age pension, often
without actuarial reduction. The rules allow for early withdrawal with occupa-
tional pension before age 65 at a reasonable replacement ratio, but allow also
for employers and workers to make separate arrangements via the occupational
pension system, so-called "buy-outs". These agreements result in an even higher
replacement ratio, enough for the employee to live on without withdrawing na-
tional old age pension.
As we understand it, the common assumptions in the literature when model-
ing retirement behavior has been that national old age pension and occupational
pension is withdrawn at the same time, and that individual agreements with
the employer are negligible. Both assumptions can be criticized when looking
at real data. In order to accurately model behavior we need the relevant alter-
natives faced by the individuals. We therefore need to know more about these
special agreements and the timing of bene￿t claims.
The next section, Section 2, we give a concise summary of the rules and
legislation for occupational pension system. In particular, we discuss the in-
stitutional background for early retirement pension through the occupational
pension system. In section 3 we present data and give exit frequencies by type
of exit. We also study the timing of occupational pension and national old age
pension withdrawal. Then we compare the actual replacement ratio with what
the rules prescribe. We conclude the paper in Section 4.
2 Swedish pension system
The Swedish pension system has undergone a major reform during 2003. How-
ever, in this study we are interested in the retirement behavior and the options
available in the 1990s. During this period, the Swedish pension system included
two main parts; the national old age pension system (OAP) and the occupa-
tional pension system (Tj￿nstepension, TJP). The occupational system function
as a complementary pension plan to the national old age pension system. It has
also undergone several changes during later years but perhaps not as deep as
the national old age pension system.
These pension systems are discussed in some detail in a number of papers (see
e.g. Palme and Svensson, 1997, 2002a). Below, we will give a brief presentation
of the general structure of the two main systems.
32.1 National old age pension system
During the 1990s the OAP system applied to all citizens as a de￿ned bene￿t
system. It consisted of the basic part (folkpension) and the supplementary part
(ATP). In short, the national old age pension system was an aggregate of several
smaller systems aiming at providing social security to all citizens.
Regarding the old age pension system (OAP), the individual earns "pension
points" during the working life that entitles her to a pension bene￿t after re-
tirement in the ATP (the basic part is unrelated to previous earnings). The
mandatory retirement age in the national old age pension system is 65. The
rules permit an individual to withdraw the pension early from age 61 (age 60
before 1998) or delay it until age 70. If the individual decides to retire before
(after) the mandatory retirement age, the monthly pension bene￿ts are reduced
(increased) with a actuarial adjustment. Although the individuals have the
option to early (and late) withdrawals, in practice very few utilizes this option.
Another important feature of the OAP system is that it only covers pensionable
incomes up to 7.5 basic amounts (BA).1 For an individual with pensionable
incomes above 7.5BA and full earnings history, the national pension bene￿ts
amounts to 14211 SEK (in 1999 prices).2
2.2 Occupational pension systems
Sweden is a country with a high degree of union membership. The occupa-
tional pension plans are divided into four main collective agreements relating
to employees in four main sectors; SAF-LO and SAF-PTK agreements for the
blue and white collar workers in the private sector, respectively, the PA-KL and
PA91 agreements for the local governments and central government employees,
respectively.3
One outcome of the collective agreements ￿negotiated between the employ-
ers￿associations and the federations of trade unions in each of the four main
sectors ￿was originally to guarantee a complementary pension for the income
1The BA is usually deterimined to follow price movements. In 1999, 1 BA=36400 SEK ￿
360e.
2This person would have (in 1999 prices) 11830 SEK per month comming from the ATP
system and, if married, another 2381 SEK as basic part pension (folkpension). The ATP
pension income is calculated as 0:6 N
30 (A ￿ 1) where N is the maximum of the number of
earnings years and 30, and A is the average earnings of the 15 best years below 7.5BA. The
basic part pension is 96% of the BA for unmarried and 78.5% of the BA for married.
3The collective agreement for blue collor workers was namned STP before 1996, and that
for local government employees was named PFA-98 after 1998.
4losses above the top compensation level in the national old age pension system
of 7.5BA. Nowadays most of these agreements have expanded to give not only
complementary pension for incomes below the 7.5BA threshold.4 The agree-
ments also ￿with some variation ￿give income complements in other parts of
the social security system such as the national survivor￿ s pension, childrens￿
pension, the part-time pension, as well as give early retirement option plans.
The outsider in this respect is the SAF-LO agreement, which does not allow for
early withdrawal of occupational pension before the age of 65.
A major share of those employed in local governments, covered by the PA-
KL agreement, are women in low-income jobs: about 80% of local employees
are women. The SAF-LO agreement also represent below-mid income earn-
ers. About two thirds of the white collar workers, SAF-PTK, are men. This
agreement typically covers groups with the highest incomes, and among these
workers the average income is higher than among workers in any of the other
agreements.
Although some important di⁄erences exist across sectors they are fairly sim-
ilar in structure as to how bene￿ts are de￿ned. The usual case is to de￿ne
bene￿ts as a function of the previous earnings within a certain occupational
sector, the years of service within that sector, and retirement age.
The pension is, if used simultaneously, designed to complement the national
pension. However, notably, the SAF-PTK, the PA-91, and the PA-KL agree-
ments also allow for early retirement using the occupational pensions only. The
early withdrawal generally includes an actuarial adjustment of the bene￿t level.5
The employer has to formally agree to early retirement through the occupational
pension. The early retirement age is for most groups 60-64.6
The replacement rates within the TJP systems, after the mandatory retire-
ment age of 65, are generally low for incomes below 7.5BA and higher for incomes
above this threshold. However, if the individual retires before the mandatory re-
4All occupational schemes also have a contribution de￿ned bene￿t as well. In our study
will not go into any detail about these since they are relatively small in comparison to the
ordinary pension.
5The actuarial adjustment is 0.4% in PA-91 for each month of early withdrawal after
age 60 and before the month of the 65th birthday. The adjustment in the SAF-PTK and
PA-KL agreements are determined in a more complex way since it is higher for some years
and lower for others. The monthly adjustment ranges from 0.3% to 0.5% in PA-KL and lies
approximately at 0.5% in SAF-PTK.
6The early retirement option should not be confused with the lower mandatory retirement
age that some some minor occupational groups ￿typically in the state sector, but also in the
local government sector ￿has. These groups receive occupational pension until they reach age
65, the mandatory retirement age in the national old age pension system.
5tirement age, the SAF-PTK and PA91 agreements include a clause of higher re-
placement rates in that income segment until the individual reaches the manda-
tory retirement age. The PA-KL agreement is set up a little di⁄erently, since
this pension is coordinated with other pensions, as well as with the social se-
curity system.The PA-KL agreement stipulates a relatively high replacement
ratio for early retirement before age 65, but if the individual simultaneously
receives national old age pension, then the occupational pension is reduced. As
mentioned, the agreement for blue collar workers (SAF-LO) does not allow for
early withdrawal of occupational pension before the age of 65.
Figure 1 gives a broad picture of the di⁄erent replacement rates (without
actuarial adjustments) in the four collective agreements for the years until age
65 for a worker who decides to retire early before age 65. Figure 2 gives the
corresponding levels after age 65. (We have plotted PA-KL as if it would give the
same replacement ratios independently if the retirement age is before or after
age 65. Since it is coordinated with other pension income this graph rather
shows the net bene￿t level, including national old age pension.) SAF-LO does
not provide an early retirement option which is why the rate for this sector is
zero. For an average-salary worker in the SAF-PTK system with an wage of
7.4BA the compensation ratio is 10% of the qualifying wage after age 65. In
these ages the pension hence function as a complement to the national old age
pension. If this person would retire early at, say, age 61 the compensation rate
is 65% (excluding actuarial adjustments) in ages 61-64.
2.2.1 Golden handshake agreements within the occupational pension
system
The occupational pension plans also give employer and employee an option to
can make special pension arrangements that go beyond the rules in the standard
agreements. In order to reduce the number of employees and/or restructure a
￿rm or organization, ￿rms and other types of employers can o⁄er older workers
generous pension plans.
A usual rule in this case seems to be a compensation rate of about 80%,
as well as o⁄setting of any possible loss in ATP points after age 65 which the
employed might su⁄er because of the special pension arrangements (see Waden-
sj￿ and Sj￿gren, 2000). There may be strong incentives for ￿rms to "buy-out"
the older employees as these are associated with high pension premiums rates.
Old workers are normally protected by employment security rules with prohibit
6Figure 1: Bene￿ts recieved before age 65 (replacement rates): 1. SAF-PTK, 2.
PA-91, 3. PA-KL, 4. SAF-LO, 5. Maximum according to the complementary
rule in the income-tax legislation
7Figure 2: Bene￿ts recieved after age 65 (replacement rates): 1. SAF-PTK, 2.
PA-91, 3. PA-KL, 4. SAF-LO, 5. Maximum according to the complementary
rule in the income-tax legislation
8employers to get rid of older workers before employing younger personnel (last-
in, ￿rst-out). The special agreements give an employer a chance to get around
such rules. It may also be better for working moral since it looks better for
the company to give someone a special early retirement pension than to ￿re
someone (Wadensj￿ and Sj￿gen, 2000).
The complementing rule in the income-tax legislation stipulates how much
of pension payments that is possible to count as tax-deductible against the
company-tax. The rule can be seen as a norm for how these special pension
arrangements are set up. There are however no real (legal) limit as to how high
the pensions can be. The rule imply that occupational pension payments are
deductible to 80% of the part of the qualifying wage up to 7.5 BA, 70% of the
part of the qualifying wage between 7.5 BA and 20BA, and 40% of the part of
the qualifying wage between 20BA and 30BA. The replacement rates stipulated
by this rule is shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2 (as 5. Complementary rule).
Since most workers, also white collar workers, earn below 7.5BA, the e⁄ective
rate which is company-tax deducible is 80%.
3 Empirical ￿ndings
3.1 Data
We use a subset of the Longitudinal INdividual DAta set (LINDA), which is a
register-based longitudinal data set drawn from income registers and popula-
tion censuses (for a detailed description of LINDA, see Edin et al (2001), and
http://www.nek.uu.se). It consists of a large panel of individuals, about 300,000
individuals annually, or about 3% of the population, representative of the over-
all population from 1960 to 2000.7 After dropping a minor share of individuals
with inconsistent income records, we observe 33,704 men and 41,383 women
that are 50+ during 1992-2000. We categorize individuals by occupational sec-
tor by using the source of occupational pension, i.e., from which occupational
sector that the pension is paid out. To avoid unnecessary complications, we
drop individuals ex post with multiple claims from more than one occupational
pension source.
We use di⁄erent subsets of the data in di⁄erent parts of this paper. In
the next subsection we study typical exit pattern from the labor market. To
7The data base also contains information on all family members of a sampled individual,
as long as they remain in the household.
9this end we use the panel unconditionally of type of exit path (Sample A). In
Section 3.3 we examine the timing of pension withdrawal from the national OAP
and the TJP systems, i.e., at which ages individuals decide to start pension
claims. The data set is therefore restricted to individuals 50+ for whom we
observe the ￿rst claim of occupational pension and/or of national old age pension
within the observation period (Sample B). Using a third subset of data we
discuss replacement ratios in the occupational pension systems. Here we include
individuals aged 50 or more, for whom we observe the ￿rst claim of occupational
pension (regardless of national old age pension) within the observation period
and at least one preceding year of work income as main source of income (Sample
C).8 For samples B and C we require that individuals are observed during the
whole period.
There are 8,615 men and 9,199 women for whom we observe the ￿rst claim
of occupational pension within the observation period. The year of the ￿rst
occupational pension claim is de￿ned as the year in which occupational pension
is paid out if none was received in the preceding year. This means that the ￿rst
claim can be observed in the second year of the panel, i.e., in 1993. Of these,
about one half (4,859 men and 4,995 women) have work (or active business
income) as their main source of income in the year preceding the ￿rst year with
occupational pension claim.
Since individuals may change any time during the year there is a high possi-
bility, with the annual structure of data that LINDA has, that the transition year
(the year when an individual changes from work to pension income) becomes
di¢ cult to use. To avoid potential part-time and part-of-the-year problems we
will not use the transition year in our study. The procedure is instead to measure
individuals in three-year panels, centered around the transition year.
This implies that the ￿rst year of occupational pension claim must be ob-
served no later than two years before the panel ends, i.e., in 1999. This restric-
tion reduces the sample to 4,226 men and 4,481 women. The shortest (longest)
time we might observe an individual before his or hers ￿rst occupational pen-
sion claim is thus 1 year (7 years). Some of these had occupational claims from
multiple sectors which resulted in a ￿nal sample consisting of 3,068 men and
3,664 women.
8We also include those with active business income as main income.
103.2 Typical exits
In Sweden, the mandatory retirement age is 65. However, as reported in Hall-
berg (2003), only about one third of those whose income from work is their
main income source at age 60 work steadily until the age of 65, and then start
collecting pension bene￿ts. The early withdrawal from the labor market is thus
substantial. It is useful to examine the empirical magnitude of di⁄erent exit
routs which we will do below.
Table 1 for men and Table 2 for women give details about exit routes by
retirement age, using Sample A. The tables give the proportion of exits with a
particular main income source (representing more than 50% of total income).
For each age group the main source of income is examined conditional on that
the main income source two periods earlier was either from work or active busi-
ness. The list of income types includes all the major unearned income types,
transfers and bene￿ts, including occupational pension (TJP). (The category
"Mixed sources" means that we are unable to classify into a speci￿c source be-
cause the individual did not have one income which was more than 50% of total
income.)
The exit routes vary by age and to some extent by gender. In ages 55-59
early retirement from the labor market is ￿nanced through unemployment insur-
ance (UI), sickness insurance (SI), occupational pensions (TJP), and disability
pension insurance (DI). When a worker turns 60 or 61, the importance of TJP
as exit route increases dramatically, for men the exit rate increases from about
15% to 33%, while exit rates to other sources, in particular SI and UI, dimin-
ishes. This is natural considering the rules. As we shall see below, many do not
have the possibility to claim TJP before 60, and those that do claim TJP before
61 are relatively few in numbers because of the lower overall exit rate in those
age groups (see the bottom line in the tables). There are minor occupational
groups, particularly in the state sector, who have a lower mandatory retirement
age, e.g., military, pilots, ￿remen, and ballet dancers, some as early as 55. The
exits to TJP before age 60 should mainly come from these groups.
One should also note that the exit rates presented in the tables include all
workers from all sectors of the economy, including blue collar workers, who,
according to their occupational pension scheme, cannot claim TJP early before
the age of 65. According to Palme & Svensson (2002), this group is overrep-
resented among those that exit via SI or UI. Thus, among those that have the























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































13sector, and local government employees, we should expect an even higher exit
probability to TJP than that shown in our tables.
These results hence show that a substantial fraction of those that exited
in ages 56-60 did so via the use of occupational pension. In ages 60-64 the
occupational pension was actually the most important exit route. Hallberg
(2003) reports that about 98% of those aged 60-64 with TJP as their main
income source also had TJP as main income source in the following year. The
transition into TJP as main income source thus seems to be terminal before
age 65 (i.e., it is less likely that individuals that has begun their TJP claim
stops or reduces this claim before age 65). The sizable in￿ ow into TJP as
dominant income source therefore also re￿ ects a considerable increase in the
stock of occupational pensioners.9
3.3 Timing of pension withdrawal
The mix and the timing of income from di⁄erent sources are often rather sim-
pli￿ed in the literature, but can be quite unorthodox in real life. Here we look
at the timing of pension withdrawal with the occupational and national old age
pension systems. Table 3 and Figure 3 (using Sample B) show the age distri-
bution of the ￿rst occupational pension claim by sector. Over the sample as a
whole the table clearly indicates that the vast majority of individuals make their
￿rst pension withdrawal at age 65. However, a nonnegotiable amount, about
39%, make their ￿rst withdrawal prior to their 65th birthday.
The in￿ uence of sector a¢ liation is however evident. Blue collar workers
do not have the possibility to claim occupational pension early. Only 2.8%
withdraw occupational pension before age 65. It is most likely that this group
exit from the labor market through other channels. As indicated in Palme &
Svensson (2002) blue collar workers are overrepresented in exits via sickness
(SI) and unemployment (UI) insurances. Employees in the three other major
sectors use however early withdrawal of occupational pension to a large extent.
According to our results, 51% of the central government employees and 47% of
the white collar workers in the private sector have started their withdrawal of
occupational pension at age 61 or earlier. Employees in the local government
9In comparison, individuals with SI as ￿rst main income source after retiering from the
labor force are less likely to stay uninterruptedly with this income source until age 65. Some
individuals return to work or becomes elegible for DI. Hallberg (2003) and Palme and Svensson
(2002a) show that the ￿rst route to DI usually is via a spell of SI. The exit probability to
DI in our tables will thus capture shorter, intermediate, spells of sickness insurance but not
longer ones. These will instead contribute to the SI exit.
14Figure 3: Age of occupational pension claim
go with this type of pension later, many at age 63: the cumulative share that
have initiated their occupational pension withdrawal increases from 34% at age
62 to about 60% at age 63. The group of individuals in category "other" is very
small, however also here we see a clear tendency of early occupational pension
claim.
Looking at the age distribution for the claiming year of national old age
pensions a dramatically di⁄erent picture evolves. Figure 4 show that the spike
at 65 is more pronounced and individuals are less prone to make old age pension
withdrawals prior to their 65th birthday. There is not much di⁄erence between
sectors.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































16Figure 4: Age of national old age pension claim
17Figure 5: Age di⁄erence between national old age pension claim and occupa-
tional pension claim
vorable due to the actuarial adjustment on early claims (and, possibly, also due
to a potential loss in pension points in the ATP system). However among those
that did, one should expect that it is common to combine these payments with
early occupational pension claims. Since the age distribution is di⁄erent for the
two types of pension, we are interested in the source of this discrepancy. Table 4
and Figure 5 give the number of years between the initial occupational pension
withdrawal and the old age pension withdrawal. A positive number indicates
that the individual made a withdrawal from the occupational pension before she
began her withdrawal from the old age pension. A negative number indicate the
reversed order of withdrawals (old age pension ￿rst, then occupational pension).
The spike at 0 (about 72% in the population as a whole) indicates that
the normal case is to start withdrawal of occupational and old age pension si-
multaneously. Nevertheless, in accordance with what has said above, about

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































19they start their old age pension withdrawal.10 Again blue collar worker a⁄ect
the aggregate measure, since they are restrained from early withdrawal of oc-
cupational pension. We therefore give the age di⁄erence between the initial
withdrawal in OAP and TJP by occupational sector. We see that a fair share
of workers in other sectors withdraw TJP before OAP: 42% of employees in
central government, 38% of local government employees and 26% employees in
the white-collar private sector do. It thus seems to be very common to have a
few years where only occupational pension is withdrawn in those sectors where
withdrawal prior to age 65 is allowed. In local government sector there is a peak
at +2 years, which is in compliance with the ￿nding that many employees in
the local government leave the labor force at age 63 with occupational pension
only.
To summarize, this section has shown that many individuals who exit early
￿rst make use of their occupational pension until the age of 65, without making
any national old age pension withdrawal. At their 65th birthday the occupa-
tional pension is reduced while the (normal) withdrawal of national old age
pension is started. As we understand it, the common assumption in the liter-
ature when modeling retirement behavior is that national old age pension and
occupational pension is withdrawn at the same time. This can thus be criti-
cized when looking at real data. Because we see so much variation in pension
withdrawal from the occupational pension system we gather that the underlying
decision when to retire is more focused on the timing of the occupational pen-
sion than it is on that of the national old age pension, much more than previous
retirement literature suggests. To understand retirement in Sweden we should
keep this mind.
Clearly, the rules in the occupational pension schemes support this behavior.
First, they allow for early withdrawal with occupational pension at replacement
ratios substantially higher than the 10% which normally is paid out when both
the national old age pension and the occupational pension is used simultane-
ously. Some of these early withdrawal rules are set up for occupational groups
with an early mandatory retirement age. Second, employers and workers can
make special arrangements (with even higher replacement ratios) during the
years until mandatory retirement (so called "buy-outs"). As we will see below,
the major part of early retirement pension agreements made through the oc-
cupational pension system resulted in very high replacement ratios, and hence
10Delaying occupational pension efter withdrawal of the national old age pension is very
rare. About 5% make their claim in reversed order, with a peak just one year before.
20have the necessary ingredients for a typical "buy-out".
3.4 Replacement ratios
Using the third data subset (Sample C) from LINDA we now study the replace-
ment ratio, i.e., the occupational pension bene￿ts as a quota of earlier wage
earnings. One issue we pursue is how well the formal rules describe actual data
of pension pay-outs.
The formal rules in the occupational pension system determines the bene￿t
level as a share of earlier wage, the "qualifying wage". The di⁄erent occupa-
tional sectors use, however, somewhat di⁄erent procedures how to determine
the bene￿t level. Nevertheless, all of them include the qualifying wage and the
number of years of service within the current occupational sector as the main
features. The qualifying wage is an average taken over the last year￿ s sector-
speci￿c wage earnings before pensioning (the exact de￿nition is depending on
the sector a¢ liation), weighted by the number of service years.
In our data we cannot observe neither the number of years in service within
a speci￿c sector nor the qualifying wage perfectly. We have chosen to assign the
maximum number of service years (which is 30 years for all sectors) to everyone
in the sample, and compute the qualifying wage as the mean of the taxable
income in the last ￿ve years prior to the year of ￿rst occupational pension
withdrawal. The intention behind the procedure is that we do not want to be at
risk of overstating the replacement ratios in any way.11, 12 We have, furthermore,
chosen to measure the replacement ratio in the ￿rst year after we ￿rst observed
an occupational pension claim.13
11We use fewer than ￿ve years for qualifying wage determination depending on how many
years of observation we have before the ￿rst year of occupational pension claim.
12By assigning 30 service years we will, for some individuals, overstate the qualifying wage.
Also by using taxable income instead of the sector speci￿c labor earnings, which we do not
observe perfectly, we may overstate the qualifying wage since taxable income include any
earned income (plus that from business, net of general decuction and any pension insurance
premiums and periodically allowances paid).
The qualifying wage is measured up to a year before the start of the occupational pension
claim. Our measure of the replacement ratio hence misses the real wage increase during the
last year of work. As a sensitivity check we therefore adjusted our measures accordingly ex
post, using the average real wage change for white collar workers. We found however no or
very little change in the results.
The average qualifying income in our sample (Sample C) were 7.44BA (271,000 SKR ￿
29,000 EURO) for men and 4.50BA (164,000 SKR ￿ 18,000 EURO) for women (in 1999
SKR).
13That is, for someone who did not claim occupational pension at age 60 but did so at age of
61, we measure the the ￿rst full-year equivalent with occupational pension withdrawal in the
year when he turned 62. The replacement ratio is then this amount divided by the qualifying
21Figure 6: Replacement ratios by sector and gender
22The replacement ratio is given in Figure 6 for the three sectors which allow
early withdrawal (SAF-PTK. PA-91, and PA-KL). The majority of observed
data points are situated around a replacement ratio of 75-80%, depending on
gender and sector. There is also a clustering in the lower end, which we return to
below. The group of observations at the high end is quite interesting considering
that this ratio clearly is higher than the highest replacement ratio stipulated in
the "standard" agreement text for early retirement with occupational pension
(65%). The peak is more likely to re￿ ect the maximum deduction rate set
by company-tax legislation (i.e., 80% for most).14 Since we do not perfectly
observe the qualifying wage of reasons described above there is bound to be
some elements of measurement error which contribute to the variation around
the peak. As mentioned, we are careful not to overstate the compensation rate.
Since some may have less than 30 years of service or have earnings from outside
their main sector, it is more likely that we underestimate than overestimate the
rate.
Of those employed in the white collar sector, central government, and in
local governments that claimed their occupational pension before the age of
65, about half (53%) had a replacement ratio above the highest replacement
ratio stipulated in the "standard" agreement (i.e., above 65%). In fact, in the
regions where we would expect to ￿nd most observations if we just trusted to
the agreement text, which is at or just below a replacement ratio of 65%, we
￿nd practically no observations!
A bit unexpectedly we ￿nd a non-negligible part of the observations situated
at a rather low replacement level, just below 25% of the qualifying wage. A
closer inspection of this group of observations shows, however, that these to a
larger extent than others have either substantial work incomes, a withdrawal of
national old age pension or disability insurance. It is natural that individuals
with alternative income sources obtain a smaller part of their income from the
occupational pension, in particular if the other income source is another type
of pension. One interpretation is that these are individuals who favored an
early exit but did not get a favorable "buy-out" o⁄er from the employer, and
therefore chose to exit with alternative income sources. Obviously, these got a
very low replacement ratio from the occupational pension system. However, if
we include other type of bene￿ts as well the overall replacement ratio may well
wage, which we measure before age 61.
14One can note that what we observe is the average and not the marginal replacement ratio.
23Figure 7: Observed replacement ratios for white collar workers in the private
sector (￿rst occupational pension claim at age 60-63)
be at a reasonable level.15
The next couple of ￿gures allow for a direct comparison of data with prevail-
ing rules. Here we have plotted the replacement ratio against the qualifying wage
(as in Figure 1), and indicated the upper and lower bounds of the "standard"
occupational pension.16 . We have also marked out the highest tax-deductible
15If we remove from our sample those individuals who have either national old age pension
or disability insurance withdrawal in the same year that we measure the occupational pension
withdrawal, we get the distributions depicted in Figure 10 in the Appendix. One can notice
that most of the accumulation in the lower end of the distribution is gone, while the centering
around 80% is more accentuated.
16The upper limit is calculated without actuarial adjustment and the lower with full ac-
tuarial adjustments due to early withdrawal. The actuarial adjustment is made with the
assumption that individuals retire at earliest possible retirement age according to their par-
ticular collective agreement.
24Figure 8: Observed replacement ratios for employees in the central government
(￿rst occupational pension claim at age 60-63)
25Figure 9: Observed replacement ratios for employees in the local government
(￿rst occupational pension claim at age 60-63)
26pension (as a ratio of qualifying income), i.e., the complementary rule in the
income-tax legislation. Interestingly the agreements for white collar workers
(Figure 7) are clearly best described by the complementary rule, and not at all
by standard agreement rules. Between the two bands that mark out the highest
and lowest possible replacement rate according to the standard agreement, very
few observations appear. If going by the text we would hence clearly underes-
timate the true value of this bene￿t. For central government employees (Figure
8) there is instead an accumulation of observations on the upper bound of the
"standard" occupational pension (no actuarial adjustment). Their agreements
made also these quite well o⁄but perhaps not as well as the white collar workers.
Also for many in this group we would be at risk of underestimating their true
bene￿t. Replacement rates for the local government employees have a much
higher spread (also if we were to exclude those with a simultaneous withdrawal
of either old age pension or disability insurance, or work incomes). For this
group it is hence harder to say whether the bene￿ts actually follow the stan-
dard agreement text or not. It might be that we make a worse job of predicting
the qualifying wage for this group compared to the other two groups.
4 Summary and conclusions
Exits via occupational pension are substantial in Sweden, particularly in ages
60-64. In those ages occupational pension is the most common exit route. This
study highlights some notable di⁄erences between actual pension bene￿ts in the
occupational pension system and those stipulated by the standard agreements.
We ￿nd that the individuals get far better options than those given by the
standard agreement.
Many individuals who exit early in Sweden ￿rst make use of their occupa-
tional pension until the age of 65, without making any national old age pension
withdrawal. At their 65th birthday the occupational pension is reduced while
the normal withdrawal of national old age pension is started. As we understand
it, the common assumption in the literature when modeling retirement behavior
is that national old age pension and occupational pension is withdrawn at the
same time. This can thus be criticized when looking at real data. Another ￿nd-
ing is that many get a higher bene￿t than what the standard agreement text
stipulates. Our results suggests, depending on gender and sector, that the ma-
jority of early retirement programs in the occupational pension system render
27a replacement ratio of 75-80%. One important implication of these ￿ndings is ￿
if we just relied on the standard agreement text ￿that the e⁄ects of economic
incentives on retirement very well might be over-estimated.
Some of these early withdrawals are made by particular occupational groups
that have a lower mandatory retirement age. However, employers and workers
can ￿within the occupation pension system ￿make special arrangements and
themselves specify a retirement age and negotiate about, e.g., the replacement
ratio during the years until mandatory retirement age (so called "buy-outs").
Not many decide to withdraw their national old age pension early. Because
we see so much variation in pension withdrawal from the occupational pension
system one conclusion must be that the underlying decision when to retire is
more focused on the timing of the occupational pension than it is on that of the
national old age pension. To understand retirement in Sweden one should keep
this mind.
We hence point at the importance of private alternatives for retirement in
Sweden. However, our results might be equally important for other countries
which also have several parallel pension bene￿t plans for the individual to choose
from.
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